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Abstract
The Second Commandment, prohibiting both the worship and manufacture
of graven images, is often employed as a mechanism for explaining a per-
ceived absence of Jewish participation in the visual arts, in spite of a well
recorded history of Jewish participation in the manufacture of graven images
which are typically classed as craft objects. This article aims to introduce to
theology the scepticism towards hierarchical distinctions between art and
craft which is already familiar in the world of art theory, and by so doing
prompt a dislocation of theological reflection on works of art from the point
of visual engagement to the point of manufacture. It suggests that attentive-
ness to Jewish discourses about material production opens up interesting and
potentially generative possibilities for work in theology and the arts beyond
the consideration of specifically Jewish art.
My higher education began, inauspiciously, amid the dust and noise of a
cinderblock warehouse with a corrugated metal roof, hot in summer and
bitterly cold in winter, unless the foundry was running (and, for the most
part, the foundry only ran during the summer). This was the sculpture de-
partment at what was then a small, and is now a defunct, school of art in the
south-eastern United States. Under the watchful eye of instructors with names
like Cohen and Emmanuel, I learned to shape wood and cast bronze, to form
figures from clay, to carve them from stone.
We were never concerned about the possibility of idolatry.
What we were concerned with, deeply concerned with, was the possibility
that what we were creating was not really art. We worried that it was either
too decorative, or else too functional. That it might accidentally match some-
one’s sofa. That it might, worst of all, be mistaken for craft.
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At approximately the same time that I was completing my studio training,
Grace M. Jantzen published a review article, ‘Beauty for Ashes: Notes on the
Displacement of Beauty’,1 covering a number of then-recent volumes, several
of which have since become classics, in which she identifies and critiques the
tendency of theological writing on aesthetics and art to assume the primacy of
Christian doctrine as the measure of artistic value, and argues the need for:
a theology not based on the standard formulations of doctrine and practice of the
christendom of modernity but on a divine horizon in which alterities of gender,
economics, and ethnicity are allowed to destabilize our comfortable assumptions,
and in which the ethical and aesthetic considerations generated by these alterities
shape the theology as surely as they are shaped by it.2
Jantzen’s early death prevented her own vision of such a project from reaching
fruition, and very little of the work done since that time has taken her pre-
scription seriously; 3 this article represents a very preliminary attempt at a
response, an engagement with alterity that points towards a constructive
reshaping of theology via careful consideration of the religious assumptions
which underlie hierarchies of aesthetic value.
The history of Jewish material production, prior to the nineteenth century,
appears to be predominantly a history of precisely the sort of decorative or
functional objects which my classmates and I were so keen to avoid. Harold
Rosenberg made this point explicitly in a 1966 talk given at the New York
Jewish Museum on the subject of ‘Jewish Art’: ‘In short, a Jewish handicraft
exists and a handicraft tradition. This is what scholars usually accept as Jewish
art.’4 From the nineteenth century onwards, scholars who perceive Judaism as
a religious system, as opposed to an ethnicity, have been prone to narrate a
history of exceptionalism, if not outright apostasy, when describing material
production by Jews which does not fit within the category of craft.5 Leaving
aside the art historical works which avoid engaging with religion and instead
attempt to trace a common ‘Jewish experience’,6 there remain few, if any,
discussions of Jewish art which fail to make reference to the commandment
against graven images, and indeed most treat it as the natural starting point: the
first thing which we must all understand about Jewish art is that it may not,
strictly speaking, actually exist.7 Clearly, the present article is no exception to
this rule. I hope, however, that it may lay the ground for future discussions of
art and theology which are inclusive of Jewish contributions evaluated on
their own merits, rather than read through a hermeneutics of contrast—the
tendency to treat Judaism as an inversion of Christianity, by virtue of the
assumption that it is ‘a tradition of law without grace’—which has long
characterised Christian theological use of post-Biblical Jewish sources.8
What I am proposing is subtly different from the use of Jewish texts to buttress
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some existing doctrine of orthodox Christianity: I am not suggesting that
Jewish sources be read as supportive or confirmatory of Christian universalism,
but rather that they be taken precisely as challenges to that universalism, as
able to prompt lines of inquiry that would not be readily approachable by the
normal routes of systematic theology.9 I am aiming not at syncretism, but
pluralism.
In this article, I will argue that anxiety over what art is, or, more properly,
over what is and is not art, is the fraternal twin to the anxiety that theology
(and particularly Jewish theology) suffers over questions of image and idolatry.
Moreover, I would like to argue that these twin anxieties over which sorts of
images are permissible, or even desirable, may themselves be read as mutually
constructive of each other, and it behoves scholars of theology and the arts to
attend to the discourse of artistic value as also a discourse of religious differ-
ence. My intention is neither to dismantle the existing art historical consensus
on the range of Jewish material production (although I will indicate points at
which others have opened that consensus up to questioning) nor to erect a
counter-narrative in its place, but rather to offer, particularly to theologians of
the arts, some suggestions of where the broad range of Jewish thought—from
the Hebrew Bible to modern secular philosophy—extends an understanding
of the work of art that is considerably more complex than recourse to the
Biblical text would indicate. My ultimate aim is to introduce to theology the
scepticism towards hierarchical distinctions between art and craft which is
already familiar in the world of art theory, and by so doing prompt a disloca-
tion of theological reflection on works of art from the point of visual engage-
ment to the point of manufacture. I suggest, in short, that attentiveness to
Jewish discourses about material production opens up interesting and poten-
tially generative possibilities for work in theology and the arts beyond the
consideration of specifically Jewish art.
I . BEGI NNING
Let me begin, as most studies of Jewish art do, with the Bible—but instead of
the nineteenth chapter of Exodus, I want to focus first on the first chapter of
the book of Genesis. Here, the creator creates, and, as Melissa Raphael is at
pains to point out in her most recent book, the creator beholds creation, and
sees that it is good.10 Susan Handelman notes that the Biblical creation myth
relates a distinctively Jewish form of generativity:
In popular Greek religion, the gods were anthropomorphically envisioned as
producers of things after the analogy of animal procreation. The divinity begot
other gods. Jewish thought was strikingly different. The God of Scripture was a
creator of the world, not as begetter but as artisan (as in the famous midrash, ‘God
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looked into the Torah and created the world,’ after the manner of an architect). A
begetter begets something out of his own essence, like himself; whereas an artisan
creates something different from and unlike himself.11
The creator creates; the earth not begotten, but made. The creator beholds
creation, the entirety of which, both action and result, is a visual spectacle.
It is, however, no image—at least, not in the sense of the English word,
which derives from the Latin imago and refers to a likeness, or imitation, of
another thing.12 No, the introduction of images into the visual field must wait
until the sixth day, the twenty-seventh verse, when the creator creates
humanity:
<ta arb{ hbqnw rkz wta arb{ <yhla <lcb{ wmlcb{ <dah-ta <yhla arbyw
And God filled humankind with God’s own Image (tselem); God created them
male and female, filling both with the Image of God.13
This verse is the source text for what contemporary Jewish theologians, such
as Arthur Green,14 Melissa Raphael, and David Blumenthal, call the ‘theology
of image’. The notion that humanity bears the Image of God means that
humanity becomes a source of theological understanding: the attributes of
God are reflected in humanity; a statement that can be made about humanity
also applies to God.15 Much as art schools in years past filled their studios with
plaster casts of great works for students to study, we can learn about the
original by examining the imitation; we see the Other reflected in our own
faces.16 It is significant to note that while Blumenthal is firmly focused on
seeking an understanding of God couched in human terms, he also posits that
most statements that might be made about God can also apply to humanity,
that the attribute of holiness is an essential part of the Theology of Image—
humans partake of, and are able to understand themselves through,
Godliness.17 This move also has scriptural roots, of course—for example,
the commandments in Leviticus that Israel is to be holy as God is holy.18
But the theology of Image is not simply a Jewish gloss on Platonism; humanity
is not a pale copy of God. Rather, ‘[h]umanity, in its individual and collective
existence, is created in God’s image and hence struggles, together with God,
to live the depth of that image’.19 The Theology of Image reveals God and
humanity engaged in mutual regard, each learning how to be themselves
through encounter with the other.20
The creator creates a self-image, but even this very first act of image-
making carries traces of anxiety. By the twenty-second verse of the third
chapter of Genesis, the creator decides that the creation has become too
close an imitation, has transgressed not only through disobedience—eating
the fruit of the forbidden tree—but through a blurring of the boundary
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between creator and creation: ‘Behold, the creature of earth has become like
us.’21 The creatures’ expulsion from Eden immediately follows this observa-
tion—and several of the more common English translations link verses 22 and
23 with the insertion of the word ‘so’ or ‘therefore’, heightening the sense of
cause and effect that is implied in the Hebrew.22
It is this anxiety on which I wish to focus, this hint that the commandment
of Exodus 20:4 and Deuteronomy 5:8 might have in the first instance less to
do with making images—imitations of creation—and more to do with being
images, imitating too closely the actions of the one great Creator, blurring the
boundaries between the human self and the divine Other. Humanity reflects
the divine image, but is not itself divine, and covenantal limitations are placed
upon human activities which risk imitating divinity too closely. This is the
dark side of the Theology of Image. Viewing the covenant—and, in this case,
the second commandment in particular—through the lens of relationality, of
imitation and restriction, permits us to refocus discourse about art-making,
moving from debates over product—figurative or non-figurative, idolatrous
or reverent—to discussions of praxis.23 Idolatry, as a disruption of the rela-
tionship between human and divine, is then not so much in the eye of the
beholder as it is in the hand of the maker.
I I . MANUFACTURE
In short, I propose that the second commandment might be seen, through
contemporary eyes, not as a prohibition of images in general, but as a very
particular prohibition of art. I say ‘through contemporary eyes’ because I am
emphatically not making any claims about the historical meaning of the
Biblical text. To do so would be nonsense, as the idea of art which I am
working with is of a relatively recent vintage, being at most approximately five
hundred years old.24 The word itself is far older, being, like image, of Latin
derivation, and there is thus ample room for confusion over the meaning of
classical and medieval sources, in which ars or art is used primarily in reference
to technical skill—a phenomenon which contemporary English usage would
designate with the Teutonically-derived word ‘craft’—which originally, and
in most other language still carries connotations of strength, power, or mas-
tery.25 The power or mastery signalled by the term ‘craft’ was more often
technical (or mental) than a matter of sheer physical strength, and the word
was, for several centuries, roughly synonymous with ‘art’. The art/craft divide
dates to approximately the late seventeenth century, when ‘art’ began to take
on connotations of creativity and imagination; over time, this linguistic dif-
ferentiation came to signal a sharp conceptual divide, representing two distinct
modes of production.26
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The treatment of art and craft as distinct modes of production has, under
some schemata, been focused almost entirely on product rather than process,
form rather than function. Students today are taught that the current division
derives from the Renaissance, in which the equivalent distinction was be-
tween ‘art’ and ‘fine art’, the latter comprising painting, sculpture, and archi-
tecture, and the former every other sort of material production. Paul
Greenhalgh rightly questions the historical accuracy of this neat division,
noting that ‘fine art as such continued well after the sixteenth century to
routinely include other disciplines such as poetry, music, rhetoric and elo-
quence, and that the Renaissance groupings were not in any way system-
atic’.27 Even in the more complicated picture drawn by Greenhalgh, one finds
a vague sense that art or fine art is distinguished from its lesser cousin, craft (or
art that is not fine art) by a certain superfluity: shelter is necessary, architecture,
in the sense of space designed with aesthetic concerns in mind, is not, nor are
paintings or sculptures meant to ornament that space; communication and
information transfer are necessary, eloquence, rhetoric, and musicality are
not. I will defer from considering the questions raised by including works
of literature or music in the discussion of art, not because I believe that they
ought not qualify as such—indeed, it should be clear by end of this article that
most of what I have to say applies to these modes of production as well—but
because at this point the distinction I am attempting to illuminate, and its
historical development, is better understood when restricted to the plastic arts.
In its simplest form, the product distinction does not engage with even the
low level of functionalism apparent in the idea of superfluity; rather, an art
object is simply an object which takes a form recognisable as art—which is to
say, sculpture or painting—and a craft object is an object which takes a form
recognisable as craft—‘pottery, jewellery-making, basketry, weaving, etc’.28
However, function has become increasingly important to the definition of
art. Thus, the philosopher R.G. Collingwood formulated a still-influential
theory of art that rested primarily on the idea of art as a form of production
which does not adhere to the criteria of craft production.29 This is not to say
that art does not involve many of the same processes as craft, but the principle
of superfluity comes into play. Art transcends craft; it may utilise similar ma-
terials and methods of production, but the response it elicits from both the
artist and the viewer is incommensurate with its material origins. Art, as it is
now understood, is a unique product of the imagination of its creator, a work
of the mind as much if not more so than the hands; while a work of art might
involve images, the goal is not to imitate, but to make something wholly new:
creatio ex nihilo, or, if that seems too much of an exaggeration, then creatio ex as
close to nihilo as is humanly possible. Craft, by contrast, is understood to be
formulaic, following a set plan in order to produce an object whose charac-
teristics are predetermined. This opposition is illuminated in T.R. Martland’s
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article, ‘Art and Craft: The Distinction’, which, while outdated in its diction,
is a fair summary of the reasoning that leads to a pejorative use of the word
craft:
They are craftsmen all, Gepettos or Kings of Cyprus, who by their actions
intend to bring to life their own favourite Pinocchio or their own favourite
Pygmalion. Along with Faust in Auerbach’s cellar they all intend to evoke old
experiences rather than move on to new experiences. They all want the
security of repossessing the past, to release or defend again what they already
experience. This means none of them have room in their work for what
the work itself might add. None of them want the obligation to relate to the
open future. None of them have the intention to save themselves for what
Delacroix calls ‘a certain abandon later on, for discoveries made as the work
advances’.30
Especially interesting for my purposes are the examples of craft that Martland
selects: Pinocchio, Pygmalion.31 According to Martland, the desire to imbue
the object with life and then dwell with the companion of one’s own creation
is a flight from originality, from the risk and unpredictability entailed by
relationship with something outside of one’s own sphere of control. In striving
to bring the work to life, he suggests, Gepetto and Pygmalion paradoxically
rob the work of the capability to transform itself or its creator. They seek to
avoid a lengthy engagement with work qua work. By transforming the object
they manufacture into something other than what it is, by using the process of
manufacture as a means rather than an end in itself, they create only an image
of themselves, of the familiar. They bring the work into their world, rather
than entering into the world of the work. In so doing, they control every-
thing, and risk nothing. What Gepetto and Pygmalion seek to create, accord-
ing to Martland, is image, not art. I will return to the implications of this
image-making in terms of the second commandment at the end of this article;
for now, the suggestion that such creation may actually be less religiously
problematic than the mutually transformative engagement with art which
Martland endorses must suffice.
This hierarchical distinction between art and craft, drawn so explicitly in the
world of aesthetics and art theory, has enabled the tacit dismissal of craft as a
mode of legitimate expression worthy of serious study in disciplines such as
theology. At the same time, the categorisation of Jewish material production
as craft—and of Jewish art as the product of assimilation—has ensured that
work on art and theology, which until quite recently has been an exclusively
Christian concern, begins and ends its consideration of Jewish art and art
theory with the second commandment. The main exceptions to this circum-
stance are twentieth-century secular Jewish thinkers who have been caught up
in the more general turn to continental philosophy, and who are therefore
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read as philosophers rather than as Jews.32 Two such thinkers, Walter
Benjamin and Hannah Arendt, offer theories of art which, read alongside
the Theology of Image that has been developed by post-holocaust theolo-
gians, point the way towards a potentially positive Jewish contribution to a
theology of art. Both thinkers wrote loosely in response to Marxist material-
ism, though Arendt’s position involved considerably more critique than
Benjamin’s; both write from a secular Jewish standpoint, although certain
traces of what might be characterised as classically Jewish attitudes towards
art and images are discernible in their thought. The combination of these two
shared attitudes leads to a number of shared concerns in both articles, most
notable of which is a focus on the work of art as an object—specifically, an
object of significance which transcends its place in the system of commercial
exchange, an object possessed of irreducible—and irreproducible—qualities
which derive from its genesis as a work of human imagination.
I I I . REPRODUCTI ON
An art object, for Benjamin, has a very specific set of functions, and his article
‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ is primarily con-
cerned with the degree to which the advent of film technology with its inbuilt
reproductive capabilities has shifted the function, and therefore the nature, of
the art object away from cultic and towards political significance.33 As befits the
article’s historical focus, the actual criteria for determining whether an object
qualifies as art are implicit and unstable—‘art’ for Benjamin is whatever has
been called art in the past, or is being treated as art in the present. However,
there remain in his discourse about what is lost or dislocated in the process of
reproduction, and more so in the transference of artistic production to media in
which there is no ‘original’, ideas which are of value for my discussion.
Benjamin suggests that the original function of all art was religious.
Although he is, in this article, more concerned with religion as a social phe-
nomenon than a theological one, he nevertheless draws an implicit historical
connection between the aura of the un-reproduced art object and its historical
status as a vehicle of revelation in a cultic context.34 He goes so far as to
suggest that the increased emphasis on art for art’s sake—the beginning of the
suspicion of craft that came to pervade my own training—began in the nine-
teenth century as a way of retaining the ritualistic, quasi-religious significance
of art in the face of the advent of photography; he glancingly proposes that this
emphasis in itself constitutes a theology of art, though the concept does not
receive any further development in this particular article.35
Historically, Benjamin’s idea of aura derives from the cultic function of
objects, such as Greek and Roman statues, that came to be considered by
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later generations as archetypical works of art. The motions of pilgrimage, the
long journey undertaken in hope of standing, however briefly, in the pres-
ence of the deity that the statue represents, inform the way viewers respond
to later works of art. The object’s function as mediator between the viewer
and the deity morphed into a mediation between the viewer and the ob-
ject’s human creator, the artist, but the necessity of presence, the object’s
‘unique existence at the place where it happens to be’ remained.36 Charles
W. Haxthausen notes that the emphasis on the physicality of an object
represents an evolution in Benjamin’s concept of the aura between this
article and his previous work, in which ‘[t]he aura . . . was located in the
image, not in any unique physical object’.37 The shift of authority from
image to object, from abstract to concrete, is quite significant. The increased
importance of physicality, and decreased importance of concept, permitted
Benjamin to construct his now famous narrative of the demise of the aura,
the decentralisation of authority and the rise of the proletariat.38 Only
when the aura resides in a physical object, rather than in the idea of that
object, can the object act as the locus of authority, as in the case of the cultic
statue.
Benjamin constructs the aura as a difficult-to-grasp quality possessed by art
objects which derives from and from which is derived their status as art. It is
difficult, as a theologian, to avoid making a leap from this quality to the idea of
the soul, that equally difficult-to-grasp quality which renders humanity
human. An art object’s aura derives in no small part from its conditions of
manufacture, and it is perhaps not overstating the case to suggest—as other
theorists of art have done—that it is the artist who imbues their work with its
quality of being art, in a manner not dissimilar to the Creator breathing the
quality of being human into the creature in the second chapter of Genesis.
Reproduction, which Benjamin treats as a process by which the authority of
the original is undermined, can then be understood as a dilution of the pres-
ence of the C/creator in the I/image. All art borrows from its maker some of
the substance of that maker’s own being—its life, its tselem. All art is
reproduction.
I V. REIF ICATION
In contrast to Benjamin, Arendt offers a highly developed technical definition
of art, without assigning any function at all to art objects. In fact, to Arendt,
the art object is specifically that object which serves no discernible purpose,
which ‘must be removed carefully from the whole context of ordinary use
objects to obtain its proper place in the world’.39 In transcending use, the art
object also transcends the cycle of production and decay which mark all other
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spheres of material production. The art object does not, however, transcend
the realm of commercial exchange. Rather, to Arendt, art is defined by com-
mercial value which in no way rests on use value.
Benjamin’s idea of the aura shifted over time, from a property of ideas to a
property of objects. Arendt encapsulates this shift and theorises it as the means
by which art comes to exist: the process of ‘reification’, in which pure thought
is rendered tangible. She writes:
The thought process by itself no more produces and fabricates tangible things,
such as books, paintings, sculptures, or compositions, than usage by itself produces
and fabricates houses and furniture. The reification which occurs in writing
something down, painting an image, modeling a figure, or composing a melody
is of course related to the thought which preceded it, but what actually makes the
thought a reality and fabricates things of thought is the same workmanship which,
through the primordial instrument of human hands, builds the other durable
things of human artifice.40
Reification is the process in which abstract thoughts coalesce, solidify, become
able to be picked up and moved around and bought and sold; it enables them
to endure long after the people who thought them have ended their brief
sojourn on the earth. It is, ‘in the case of art works . . . more than mere
transformation; it is transfiguration, a veritable metamorphosis’.41 It is the
thing which makes possible the transfiguration of the space humanity inhabits
from the earth to what Arendt calls ‘the world’, a space capable of containing
human action rather than mere animal labour.42
The hierarchy of values which Arendt constructs in the pages of The Human
Condition is admittedly somewhat uncomfortable, as her student, Richard
Sennett, has noted.43 Arendt identifies three distinct fields of human endeav-
our—labour, work, and action—and places the highest value on those things
which are least associated with basic survival, valuing political action and
speech over the work of making concrete things, and work over the unending
labour of filling basic needs; it is not unreasonable to suggest that her system is
founded in, and seeks to further entrench, class privilege.44 However, this
critique ignores the degree to which Arendt emphasises the mutual inter-
dependence of labour, work, and action; while intellectual and political en-
deavours are the ideal pursuit of humans in the world, there is no escape from
the necessary labour of survival and work of building the world in the first
place.45
There are, for my purposes, two important points to take from Arendt: first,
that world-building is a necessarily human endeavour, and a constant process,
rather than something accomplished by divine fiat once upon a time. Second,
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the production of art objects plays an essential role in the world-building
endeavour:
If the animal laborans needs the help of homo faber to ease his labor and remove his
pain, and if mortals need his help to erect a home on earth, acting and speaking
men need the help of homo faber in his highest capacity, that is, the help of the
artist, of poets and historiographers, of monument-builders or writers, because
without them the only product of their activity, the story they enact and tell,
would not survive at all.46
For Arendt, art plays an essential role in the construction of the human, in the
transformation of the creatures’ dwelling space from earth to world, and in
ensuring the relative permanence of that transformation. Art makes us
human—but in so doing, it also reflects our humanity. It is a vessel which
contains, into which the artist breathes, the essential qualities that differentiate
human from mere creature—it is, in theological language, an image. In terms
which Arendt herself seems likely to have rejected, art is an image of the
image, a secondary image, a graven image. In Arendt’s schema, it is the
human, rather than the divine, creator which produces the image and
imbues it with life, and in so doing the creator realises their own humanity.47
V. CREATION
In spite of their differences, then, both Benjamin and Arendt construct a
relationship between the work of art and human being that is closely analo-
gous to the relationship between human and divine expressed in the Theology
of Image: the irreducible uniqueness of a work of art is a window into the
nature of humanity, just as Theology of Image treats the irreducible unique-
ness of a human being as a window into the nature of the divine. Understood
via Benjamin and Arendt, then, any work of artistic production, figurative,
abstract, or non-objective, is unavoidably a transgression of the second com-
mandment—but it is also an unavoidable, and perhaps even necessary, trans-
gression. By this, I mean that the capacity for transgressiveness, the urge to
create art—not just material objects, nor decorative representations of the
world as it is, but rather the drive to originality, the urge to create something
wholly new—this urge is a direct inheritance from the creator in whose image
humanity was made.
But—returning to the problem alluded to in my earlier discussion of
Martland—what does this actually mean for art, for the producers thereof,
and for the critics and theologians who comment upon it? Am I not just re-
inscribing the outdated narrative of Jewish iconoclasm so effectively
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dispatched by Kalman Bland at the beginning of this century? Am I not
relegating Jewish material culture to the realm of decorative arts and crafts,
forever divorced from any reflective or transformative potential, and similarly
revealing Jewish thought to have little to contribute to a theology of art
beyond restriction? Admittedly, the chain of reasoning I have followed
could very well lead to just that point. I resist this conclusion, however, on
two grounds. First, the art/craft dichotomy is itself an over-simplification. I
myself am a trained—though no longer practising—studio artist, as well as a
student, collector, and practitioner of craft; I have a long experience of creat-
ing, viewing, and analysing works of both art and craft. There is nothing new
under the sun; I have seen (and, to my chagrin, produced) plenty of ‘art’
which would not fit the criteria of a wholly new creation, and certainly would
not constitute the mutually transformative engagement between maker and
object that Martland proposes. Indeed, a skilled critic could argue for the
derivative nature of nearly any work. By contrast, I have seen (though,
again to my chagrin, not produced) many examples of functional or decora-
tive objects which reveal startling originality and a deep engagement on the
part of their maker. My intent here is not to perpetuate what is, in my view, a
largely false dichotomy in relation to Jewish material culture, but rather to
disrupt and problematise it. If idolatry is in the mind and hand of the maker
rather than the eye of the beholder, then attempting to categorise artistic
output as idolatrous or reverent, forbidden or safe for theological reflection,
is a futile endeavour.
Second, the historical narrative that restricts Jewish material production to
the realm of craft reveals an incomplete understanding of the complex nature
of Jewish discourse about issues connected to idolatry.48 In his article entitled
‘Attitudes Towards Christianity in the Halakah’, Louis Jacobs traces the de-
velopment of halakic positions on the manufacture, possession, and use of
devotional objects belonging to other religions; the Christian cross is a
paradigmatic example.49 Jacobs suggests that exposure to Christianity, which
combined iconism with a clearly delineated monotheism, led Rabbis of the
post-Talmudic period to construct a halakic category of objects and actions
which are forbidden to Jews as idolatrous, but permitted to Gentiles as non-
idolatrous.50 This in-between category complicated the previously clearly
delineated categories of idolatrous and permitted objects, leading to distinc-
tions based on use, rather than form—for example, Jacobs cites several rulings,
most notably from R. Isserles and R. Joseph Saul Nathanson of Lemberg, that
a Jew is permitted to wear a cross as an ornament, provided that it has never
been used for purposes of worship.51
Jacobs’s narrative of the historical evolution of halakic thought on the issue
ignores that there are even similar passages in the Talmud—for example the
exchange between Proclos and R. Gamaliel regarding the latter’s use of ‘the
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Bath of Aphrodite’. Gamaliel offers Proclos several reasons that his presence in
the bath is not a violation of the commandments against idolatry:
Nobody says the bath was made as an adornment for Aphrodite; but he says, [the
statue of] Aphrodite was made as an adornment for the bath. Another reason is, if
you were given a large sum of money, you would not enter the presence of a
statue reverenced by you while you were nude or had experienced seminal
emission, nor would you urinate before it. But this stands by a sewer and all
people urinate before it. It is only stated, their gods—i.e. what is treated as a deity
is prohibited, what is not treated as a deity is permitted.52
Gamaliel’s criteria for distinguishing between decorative object and idol are
twofold: first, there is the question of intent—Aphrodite is an adornment for
the bath, and not the other way around; second, and moreover, there is the
question of actual use, and the statue in question is demonstrably not used as
an object of worship. While there is no evidence in this passage of the third
category of objects forbidden-for-Jews-but-permitted-to-Gentiles that Jacobs
sees arising from the medieval period, the use criterion is clearly developed.
One might even argue that the intent criterion could be subsumed within the
use criterion, as the artist or craftsperson who creates an object intending that
it should represent, or function as, divinity also participates in the recognition
of that object as divine.
In this case, R. Isserle’s ruling permitting a cross as ornament becomes
impractical, unless the cross is manufactured by a (presumably non-
Christian) craftsperson who sees in the symbol no representation of divinity;
otherwise, the ornament is tainted by its association with idolatry from the
moment of its manufacture. R. Nathanson’s ruling, which specifically refers to
civic medals in the shape of a cross, has, in my view, more practical weight, as
it is more likely that the civic symbolism of the medal would overpower the
religious symbolism of its shape than that a Christian might manufacture a
cross that lacks such additional symbolic associations, and also not consider it a
representation of the divinity of Christ. Even in this case, however, one must
hold as highly improbable that the conditions of the object’s manufacture, the
degree of reverence in which it was or was not held by its creator, would be
known to the person who ultimately possesses it. To relocate the property of
being an idol from an object’s form to its conditions of manufacture, as I have
done in this article and as I argue the earlier halakhic tradition supports, is to
move that property beyond the realm of the visible (though, certainly, there
are forms of use which bring that property back into focus).
The ultimate result of this close engagement with a broad range of Jewish
sources is to expand the potential for religious engagement with art, while
heightening individual responsibility for the activities of artists and critics. Any
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form of material production risks slipping into idolatry, as the drive to ori-
ginality becomes, either as a form of self- or object-worship on the part of the
maker, or maker-worship on the part of the viewer or critic, the production’s
controlling value. This is the danger—though by no means certain—of the
theory of art proposed by Martland. But any form of material production can
also avoid this slippage, by maintaining focus on the production as an image of
creation, rather than creation itself.
This is, as I warned at the beginning, only a very preliminary attempt at
addressing Jantzen’s call for a theology which permits itself to be destabilised
(and reshaped) by serious engagement with alterity. The shift in focus from art
as the object of a viewer’s gaze to art as the process of imagination and con-
cretization opens up a multitude of new ways forward for theology of art. In
the first instance, a focus on the act of making, rather than viewing something
which has already been made, provides strong incentive for theologians to
move beyond the historical canon of great works, with all of its gendered and
ethnic problematics; it may prompt an engagement with living artists that, in
turn, brings newer understandings of the religious and spiritual more readily
within the space of theological consideration.53 It may encourage reflexivity
and an increased attentiveness to the standpoint of the researcher—although I
do not wish to suggest that a theology that attends to art as a process of making
requires the theologian to pick up their own paintbrush; Arendt’s more ex-
pansive view of making as an essential sphere of human activity, not limited to
the plastic arts, should not be forgotten: we are all, in some way, homo faber; we
are all participants in the work of creation.
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